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This article investigates whether the “creative use” of musical works, without a 
licence, is acceptable under copyright. In order to determine this issue, it is 
necessary to undertake analysis of copyright infringement with regard to musical 
works. Music, due to its own unique limitations, may be unsuited to a strict 
delineation of what may and may not be “copied”. For this reason, a general 
analysis of “creative use” of existing musical works, or portions thereof, is 
undertaken (at 2). Reference is made to historical and contemporary examples of 
the practice, including examples involving European classical music, American 
blues, jazz and hip-hop, as well as British and Irish folk and popular music. 
 
In order to properly explore specific cases of infringement of “musical works”, it is 
necessary to examine the notion of “musical work” that exists under national and 
international law. In line with this, the “idea-expression dichotomy” is also 
considered with respect to musical works (at 3).  
 
Over the course of this article (at 4) the jurisdiction of the UK is used as a case 
study for analysing the question of whether such an act of creative use is, in fact, 
an act of copyright infringement. The recent case of Newspaper Licensing 
Agency v Meltwater1 is important in this regard. Furthermore, Meltwater shows a 
strong influence from the decision of the European Court of Justice in Infopaq 
International v Danske Dagblades Forening.2 By way of contrast, related cases in 
other jurisdictions such as France, Germany, the US and Australia are also 
discussed here (at 4). The usefulness of using expert evidence from 
musicologists is queried (at 5). 
 
Ultimately, this article argues that musical creativity requires a reasonable degree 
of freedom to make creative use of existing materials. At present copyright law 
does not properly encourage the practice of making creative use of musical 
works without a license; recent case law suggests that even the use of a very 
small portion of an original work may result in infringement (at 6). This is 
                                                     
1
 Newspaper Licensing Agency v Meltwater Holding BV [2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch). 
2
 Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08) [2010] FSR 495. 
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particularly evident in light of the recent Infopaq (ECJ) and Meltwater (UK) cases. 
Evidence from other jurisdictions shows similar conflicts can arise not just with 
regard to works of music but also with regard to other creative works including 
works of literature and drama. A more flexible approach to exceptions would 
would encourage musical creativity. The possibility of a more flexible system of 
exceptions is explored (at 7). 
 
 
2 (a) Creative use of Musical Works - An Historical Perspective 
 
As discussed in detail further below, copyright infringement envisages the 
unauthorised or unlicensed use of a musical work. However, making creative use 
of existing musical materials is common in musical practice. Although the term 
“musical borrowing”3 is sometimes used to denote this, the term is problematic 
because it is rarely the case that materials are “returned” to the place where they 
were originally found. In fact, the practice appears to denote the unlicensed 
taking and use of musical materials in contexts where such use is justified as part 
of creative practice. As such the idea of making “creative use” of musical works, 
in whole or in part, is a more accurate way of conveying this idea of “justifiable 
use” than the notion of “musical borrowing”.  
 
2 (b) The European Classical Tradition 
 
Regarding authorship of music, it is widely acknowledged that making creative 
use of musical materials is an ancient practice that pervades many, if not all, 
forms of music4. With regard to European classical, operatic and “art” music, it is 
notable that up until the 19th century, many composers felt able to “copy” and re-
arrange material from their own, and each other ’s, previous works5. For instance, 
it was not illegal, nor was it seen as “unoriginal” or “wrong” for composers to re-
use melodies and to compose variations on themes which had originated with 
other composers. Examples of composers who partook in this kind of “creative 
use” include Mozart, Beethoven, Bach, Handel and Brahms.6 Therefore, in 
                                                     
3
 For uses of the term see Cohen, “Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public 
Domain”, in: Guibault & Hugenholtz (eds.), “The Future of the Public Domain” 121, 143 (Kluwer, 
Alphen aan den Rijn 2006) and Arewa, “From J.C. Bach to Hip-Hop: Musical Borrowing, 
Copyright and Cultural Context”, 84 North Carolina Law Review 547 (2006). 
4
 Charles Seeger acknowledged that folk songs were created “entirely” through a process of 
“plagiarism”. Seeger, “The Incomplete Folksinger” 450 (University of Nebraska, Lincoln 1992). 
See also Jones & Cameron, “Full Fat, Semi-Skimmed or No Milk Today: Creative Commons 
Licences and English Folk Music”, 19 International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 
259, 260 (2005), noting that much of what we term “pop” music today has its roots and structures 
in traditional music, primarily folk and blues music.  
5
 Toynbee, “Copyright, The Work and Phonographic Orality in Music”, 15 Social & Legal Studies 
77, 80 (2006). Goehr, “The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music” 181-182 (OUP, Oxford 1993).  
6
 Keyes, “Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright Protection”, 10 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 407, 436 (2004), referring to Shafter, “Musical 
Copyright” 187 (Callaghan and Company, Chicago 1932). 
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Europe during the early 18th century this kind of creative re-use of musical works 
was widespread; consequently, it was seen as “benign.7  
Successful examples of creative use of previous works by artists including 
Beethoven, Mozart, Bartok and Ives have been noted8. However, it has also 
been noted that during the 19th century, this kind of practice ceased to be 
tolerated by composers of “written” music9. In this regard, it was not until the 19th 
century that the concept of original, autonomous authorship became dominant in 
the context of European “art” music10. In fact, during the 18th and 19th centuries 
it is possible to observe the continuing ascent of the twin concepts of “the work” 
and the “Romantic author”11. The rapidly expanding market for “sheet music” was 
a determining factor in the rise of “the work”, as composers sought to protect 
their rights under copyright12. Thus, the notion of the “composer” as the sole 
“author” of a piece of music naturally led to a “loss of status” for the “performer” 
who was now seen as a mere “executant”. In conjunction with the idea of the 
“composer as author”, “the work” was held out as an “expression of the 
composer’s soul”.13 However, as discussed further below, while it may have 
largely ceased in the context of European classical music, the creative use of 
existing materials continued to play an important part in a number of other 
musical cultures and contexts. Furthermore, “originality” must be seen as 
embedded within certain contexts, and the same idea of originality may not be 
applicable in all musical contexts. 
 
2 (c) Blues, Jazz and Hip Hop  
 
One context which features a high degree of creative use of existing musical 
materials, and which has been well documented, is the blues music tradition of 
the US. Notions of “originality” and “authorship” within the blues tradition are 
difficult to define.14 Nonetheless, it is clear that a notion of “originality” is still vital 
within this tradition.15 However, it is a different type of “originality” than the 
standard under copyright law. For example, it is accepted that within the blues 
tradition “originality” is generally expressed through arrangement and 
                                                     
7
 Rosen, “Music and Copyright” 5 (OUP, New York 2008). 
8
 “Gowers Review of Intellectual Property” 67 (HMSO, London 2006); accessible at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf – referring to Arewa, supra 3, at 630. 
9
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 81. Goehr, supra 5, at 220-221. 
10
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 81. See generally Goodman, “Stealing our Heritage? Women’s Folksongs, 
Copyright Law and the Public Domain in Algeria”, 49 Africa Today 84 (2002) and Manuel, “The 
Saga of a Song: Authorship and the Case of ‘Guantanamera’” 27 Latin American Music Review 
121 (2006). 
11
 Barron, “Copyright Law’s Musical Work” 15 Social & Legal Studies 101, 122-124 (2006).  
12
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 82. See also Ehrlich, “Harmonious Alliance: A History of the Performing 
Right Society” 5 (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989). 
13
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 81. 
14
 Arewa, “Blues Lives: Promise and Perils of Music Copyright”, 27 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 573, 596-597 (2009-10). 
15
 Arewa, supra 14, at 587. 
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performance.16 The structure of the music stays relatively rigid, yet within the 
boundaries of e.g. “twelve-bar blues”, a vast array of performers are able to 
express themselves in an original way. This blues culture has been classed as an 
“oral culture”. In this regard, it is said to be “strongly determined by the need to 
reproduce knowledge” as opposed to an overriding focus on originality of “the 
work”.17 As a result, these forms of traditional music have been described as 
“iterative-variative in structure, rather than differentiated as in the case of musical 
works”.18  
 
Cohen has observed that traditional blues and jazz music typically involve a 
“ceaseless process” of making creative use of existing materials.19 For instance, 
the jazz performer is of paramount importance. The same composition can be 
arranged and performed in innumerable different ways, depending on the skill of 
the musician.20 Further to this, some jazz musicians have copied and creatively 
used other composers” works as the basis for their own compositions. For 
example, Charlie Parker often created new works from pre-existing compositional 
structures. Thelonious Monk’s “In Walked Bud” was based on a chord 
progression from a previous copyright work,21 John Coltrane used Miles Davis’ 
“So What” as the basis for his own work “Impressions”22 and Miles Davis used 
the foundational structure of Bill Evan’s “Peace Piece” for his own composition 
“Flamenco Sketches”.23 
 
Regarding music in the context of the US, it is not only blues and jazz that are 
potentially restricted by copyright law, but also “hip-hop”.24 In recent decades, the 
“sampling” culture of hip-hop music has been criticised for being unoriginal; it has 
even been described as “theft”.25 However, unlike other forms of creative use, 
sampling often involves direct use of a copyright sound recording. For this reason 
some commentators seek to differentiate this type of creative use from other 
examples.26 Nonetheless, there have also been copyright disputes over the use 
of a small portion of the underlying “musical work” in a “Hip Hop” song, such as 
                                                     
16
 Vaidhayanathan, “Copyrights and Copywrongs: The Rise of Intellectual Property and How It 
Threatens Creativity” 123 (NYUP, New York 2001). 
17
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 78. 
18
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 78. 
19
 Cohen, “Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the Public Domain”, in: Guibault & 
Hugenholtz (eds.), “The Future of the Public Domain” 121, 143 (Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn 
2006). 
20
 Ward & Burns, “Jazz – A History of America”s Music” 162 (Knopf Publishing, New York 2000). 
21
 Solis, “Monk’s Music: Thelonious Monk and Jazz History in the Making” 149 (University of 
California Press, California 2007). 
22
 Crouch, “Considering Genius – Writings on Jazz” 99 (Basic Civitas, New York 2007). 
23
 See comment and debate at http://forums.allaboutjazz.com/showthread.php?t=39671 
24
 See generally Arewa, supra 3, at 547. See also Salmon “Sampling and Sound Recording 
Reproducton – Fair Use or Infringement?” 21 Entertainment Law Review 174, 175 (2010). 
25
 Grand Upright Music, Ltd v Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F.Supp. 182 (1991) 
26
 See generally Reilly, “Debunking the Top Three Myths of Digital Sampling: An Endorsement of 
the Bridgeport Music Court’s Attempt to Afford “Sound” Copyright Protection to Sound 
Recordings”, 31 Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 355 (2008).  
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the dispute between the Beastie Boys and James Newton.27 Furthermore, it has 
been argued that “Hip-Hop” musical practices have been negatively affected by 
copyright licensing requirements.28 
 
Continuing with the specific example of blues music, Toynbee has noted that in 
the early to mid 20th century, blues melodies were frequently re-arranged and re-
used by musicians working within the blues tradition.29 As discussed further 
below, it is possible that these practices could lead to complications with respect 
to copyright law. 
 
Vaidhayanthan has noted that it was common for Muddy Waters and other blues 
singers to copy an old blues song in whole or in part and then to add their own 
stylistic originality to the song. The resulting blues song would probably be best 
described as a new arrangement of the underlying work. This type of authorship 
resulted in songs such as “Walking Blues”.30 The song is a common blues 
standard. It had been previously recorded in 1937 by Robert Johnson, while 
Muddy Waters learned it from a recording of Son House. In each version, it is 
recognisably the same song, but each recording reflects the unique performance 
and arrangement style of each musician.  
 
This type of authorship is clearly fundamental to the notions of “tradition, 
inspiration and improvisation”31 within blues music. The relevant underlying work 
may well have been in the public domain, and if so it may well have been 
possible to avoid legal difficulties regarding the use of the underlying work. There 
would only be a possible action if it was alleged that a particular copyright 
arrangement of the public domain work was infringed. In any event, no 
infringement was alleged. As Toynbee has noted, it was largely unheard of for 
blues musicians of this era to litigate regarding the taking of elements of one of 
their works. Due to the fact that the copyright law of the early 20th century was 
not strictly enforced in relation to blues music, musicians were able to continue 
utilizing this process.32  
 
However, in the case of a blues composition which is not in the public domain, an 
infringement action is more likely. The discussion of blues “style and 
presentation”33, as referred to above, is relevant to the dispute which occurred in 
the 1980s involving blues composer and musician Willie Dixon and the British 
pop group “Led Zeppelin”. Dixon alleged that Led Zeppelin’s composition “Whole 
                                                     
27
 Newton v Diamond 388 F 3d 1189 9th Cir. (2003) 
28
 Arewa, “Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess and Unfair Use”, 37 
Rutgers Law Journal 227, 227-229 (2006). Toynbee, supra 5, at 87. 
29
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 95. See also Madison, “Intellectual Property and Americana, or Why IP 
Gets the Blues”, 18 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 677 
(2007-2008). 
30
 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 122. 
31
 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 121. 
32
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 87. 
33
 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 117. 
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Lotta Love” infringed his earlier work “You Need Love”, which had been recorded 
in the early 1960s.34 From a musical point of view, there is not a great difference 
between the situation where Robert Johnson, Son House and Muddy Waters all 
play different versions of the same blues song, and the case of Led Zeppelin 
playing a blues song that took elements from Willie Dixon’s blues composition. 
Furthermore, there is nothing less “original”, from a musical perspective, in what 
early blues musicians did in the early-to-mid 1900s and what Led Zeppelin did in 
the late 1960s. The only difference is that in one case a “public domain” 
composition was used, and no licence was apparently required, whereas in the 
other case, Willie Dixon’s copyright composition was used, and therefore a 
licence was required.35 In light of the Dixon case and other cases involving blues 
“compositions”36, it is possible that an increased level of awareness of copyright 
law within the music industry has altered the acceptability of creative use of 
musical works, or portions thereof, even with respect to a form of music that is 
“traditional” in origin.  
 
2 (d) The 1960s Folk Revival and Pop Music Boom 
 
As with jazz and blues, making creative use of existing songs and melodies was 
also emblematic of the folk revival of the 1960s in the UK, Ireland and the US.37 
Jones and Cameron have noted the strong necessity for continual creative re-
use of musical materials within the British folk song tradition, something which 
was evident during the post-war folk revival.38 A number of commentators have 
noted similar examples occurring in the context of Irish traditional music39, which 
also experienced a post-war boom in the public houses of Britain and Ireland. In 
relation to the US, the same trend is visible, and one particular example stands 
out. Many of Bob Dylan”s early songs were adaptations of earlier British40, Irish41 
and North American42 folk songs.43 In some cases entire tunes were copied, 
“creatively used” and put to new lyrics written by Dylan. 
 
                                                     
34
 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 117-118. 
35
 For a discussion on the distinction between works in copyright and works in the public domain, 
see Geiger “Copyright and the freedom to create – a fragile balance” 38 International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 707, 716-722 (2007). 
36
 Arewa, supra 14, at 573-587. 
37
 Jones & Cameron, supra 4, at 260. 
38
 Jones & Cameron, supra 4, at 259-262. 
39
 Hall, “Irish Music in Camden 1945-1970” (Ph. D. Thesis, University of Sussex, accessible at 
Cecil Sharp House Library, London). See also McCann, “All That is Not Given is Lost: Irish 
Traditional Music, Copyright and Common Property”, 45 Ethnomusicology 89 (2001). 
40
 The Freewheelin’ Bob Dylan (Columbia Records, 1963) – Bob Dylan’s Dream (melody taken 
from Lord Franklin, a traditional folk standard in Britain and Ireland. 
41
 The Times they are a-Changin” (Columbia Records, 1964) – Restless Farewell (melody taken 
from the The Parting Glass, a traditional folk standard in Britain and Ireland) 
42
 The Bootleg Series vol. 1-3 (Columbia Records, 1989) - Farewell, Angelina (melody taken from 
The Wagoner”s Lad, a traditional folk standard in the United States of America). 
43
 http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2011/0528/1224297953575.html  
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In addition, much of what we term “pop music” today is influenced by forms of 
traditional music and it is, in many ways, rich with musical materials mined from 
the past.44 Furthermore, the recent UK case of Fisher v Brooker45 illustrates 
creative use in the context of pop music. In the case of Fisher v Brooker, the 
musical work “A Whiter Shade of Pale” by Procol Harem was at issue. The demo 
version of the musical work was created by songwriter, and Procul Harem band 
member, Gary Brooker. However, the song is perhaps most famous for its organ 
instrumental sections. These instrumental sections were created by Matthew 
Fisher, during the performance and recording process, in response and 
counterpoint to the chord structure devised by Gary Brooker. This contribution by 
Matthew Fisher amounted to a significant and original contribution to the work in 
order for a share of authorship to be awarded. For the purpose of this article, it is 
interesting to note that both “the Song”, as composed and presented to the band 
members in demo form by Gary Brooker, and the organ solo featured in “the 
Work” (i.e. the final recorded “arrangement” of the song), as composed by 
Matthew Fisher, were adapted to some extent from separate musical pieces 
originally composed by Bach i.e. musical works which reside in the public 
domain.46 This is a clear example creative use of existing musical materials from 
Bach’s works by both Gary Brooker and Matthew Fisher. However, because the 
works reside in the public domain, no infringement could be alleged by the 
original copyright holder.47 
 
Recently the guitarist and composer Joe Satriani settled48 a dispute in the US 
against the British group “Coldplay”. Satriani had alleged that the Coldplay song 
“Viva La Vida” infringed his earlier work.49 The songwriter Yusuf Islam (formerly 
known as Cat Stevens) has also argued that “Viva La Vida” infringed his earlier 
work, which also pre-dates Joe Satriani’s composition.50 If it were the case that 
Coldplay had re-used parts from Satriani’s composition, just as Brooker and 
Fisher had borrowed from Bach, then from a musical perspective there would be 
little difference between the creative acts in each case. The crucial difference 
from a copyright perspective is that in one case the work at the centre of the 
dispute was in the public domain and in the other case it was not. As with the 
above blues examples, acts involving public domain works appear to be much 
less controversial than acts of creative use involving copyright works. This may 
make sense from a copyright lawyer’s perspective. Nevertheless, from the point 
of view of musical practice, it is arguable that there is little difference between the 
acts of creativity involved.  
 
                                                     
44
 Toynbee, supra 5, at 80. See also Jones & Cameron, supra 4, at 260. 
45
 Fisher v Brooker [2007] E.M.L.R. 9. 
46
 Fisher v Brooker [2007] E.M.L.R. 9 at [36]. 
47
 For a discussion on the distinction between works in copyright and works in the public domain, 
see Geiger supra 35, at 716-722. 
48
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/8258217.stm  
49
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2009/apr/08/coldplay-deny-satriani-plagiarism-claims  
50
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2009/may/05/coldplay-yusuf-islam.  
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The examples above illustrate two important points. The first point centres on the 
fact that creative use of existing musical works plays an important part in musical 
cultures. However, the second point reveals that one person’s legitimate “creative 
use” may be another person’s copyright theft. In this view, it is clear that musical 
cultures can change; what was once acceptable “creative use” can eventually 
come to be seen as “copyright infringement”. In order to examine the relationship 
between music and copyright law more closely, it is necessary to examine how 
copyright defines the “musical work”. 
 
3 (a) Examining the Musical Work in International Conventions and National 
Laws 
 
The Berne Convention51 provides an international framework for copyright in 
relation to the musical work. Under Article 2(1) of Berne, the “musical 
composition with or without words” and “dramatico-musical works” are protected, 
but no further definition of “music” or “musical composition” is given. In fact, there 
are surprisingly few definitions of the “musical work” in national and international 
copyright law and there is no internationally accepted definition of the musical 
work.52 For instance, TRIPS53 largely adopted the terms of the Berne Convention 
and it did not provide any further definition of the musical work.54 The WIPO 
World Copyright Treaty of 199655 also did not give any further definition. Similarly, 
the relevant legislation in Germany56 and the US57 does not provide a definition. 
In light of this, it can be concluded that many legislative bodies, both national and 
international, accept that the terms “music” and “musical work” are inherently 
difficult to define. Furthermore, from the point of view of legislators it is not 
necessary to define the terms strictly in order to provide protection to musical 
works under copyright.  
 
In anticipation of the UK case study below (at 4), the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Sawkins v Hyperion58 is the most recent, authoritative decision on the 
                                                     
51
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works  (September 9, 1886; revised 
July 24, 1971 and amended 1979) hereafter known as Berne Convention; accessible at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html  
52
 Sterling, “World Copyright Law” 258 (3rd Ed. Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008).  
53Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (1994) (hereafter known as 
TRIPS); accessible at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm  
54
 Under TRIPS the Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention are adopted with no expansion of the 
definition of “musical work”; accessible at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_04_e.htm#1 
55
 WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996), which exists in compliance with Article 20 of the “Berne 
Convention” op. cit. and complies with the Berne Convention definition of “literary and artistic 
works”; accessible at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html#P51_3806. 
56
 German Act on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, 1965 (Urheberrechtgestz) s 2(1)(2). 
57
 See United States Copyright Act 1976 s 102(a)(2); accessible at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/copyright/copyright.act.chapt1a.html#17usc102. 
58
 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 565; [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281. See also French 
case of Sawkins v Harmonia Mundi, 19 January 2005, Nanterre District Court, 1st chamber. See 
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nature of the musical work under section 3(1) of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act, 1988. In Sawkins, the claimant argued that he owned the copyright 
in performing editions that he had prepared of works by Michel-Richard Lalande. 
A number of Lalande pieces, which were previously in fragments and were 
effectively unplayable, had been adapted into modern notation by Dr. Sawkins 
with minor editing additions. According to the court, this ultimately amounted to a 
“performing edition”. The pieces were performed from the Sawkins edition by 
musicians in order to make a recording undertaken by Hyperion Records. 
However, Dr. Sawkins’ copyright was not recognised by the record company. 
Ultimately, the court held that copyright in the performing edition vested in Dr. 
Sawkins. 
 
In coming to this decision, Mummery L.J. stated that “the essence of music is 
combining sounds for listening to”.59 Mummery L.J. also remarked: 
 
“Music is not the same as mere noise. The sound of music is intended to produce 
effects of some kind on the listener’s emotions and intellect. The sounds may be 
produced by an organised performance on instruments played from a musical 
score, though that is not essential for the existence of the music or of copyright in 
it... There is no reason why, for example, a recording of a person’s spontaneous 
singing, whistling or humming or improvisations of sounds by a group of people 
with or without musical instruments should not be regarded as “music” for 
copyright purposes.”60 
 
This is clearly a broad definition of the musical work61.  
 
3 (b) The Relevance of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy in this Context  
 
In order to analyse the notion of “musical work” in the context of infringement, it is 
necessary to consider the “idea-expression” dichotomy. It has been stated that 
while the idea/expression dichotomy has little bearing on questions of 
subsistence, it does perform “a necessary (if difficult) role in settling what 
amounts to substantial taking” by a copier62. Nonetheless, it is arguable that the 
distinction between idea and expression is an “amorphous” one63.  
 
Regardless of whether they can be described as “ideas” or “expressions”, it is the 
case that certain stylistic elements cannot be made subject to copyright. This can 
                                                                                                                                                      
1/2006 RIDA 391. 
59
 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, at [53]. 
60
 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, at [53]. 
61
 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281, at [56]. See also Rahmatian, “The 
concepts of "musical work" and "originality" in UK copyright law - Sawkins v Hyperion as a test 
case”, 40 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 560 (2009). 
62
 Cornish, Llewellyn & Aplin, “Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights” 449-450 (7th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010). 
63
 Cornish, Llewellyn & Aplin, supra 62, at 9. 
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be seen in the case of literary works and dramatic works where, for example, a 
style or genre cannot be made subject to copyright64. However, it is clear that the 
details of a plot may be subject to copyright65. For this reason, Laddie has stated 
that since copying the details of a plot can amount to infringement, even if the 
details are expressed in different language, this effectively shows the weakness 
of the idea/expression dichotomy in this regard66. Regarding literary works, Stern 
has noted that authors themselves have often disagreed over the issue of 
“originality”67. Stern stated that some authors tend to argue in favour of their own 
individual “genius”, while other authors freely acknowledge that writing depends 
upon processes of “adaptation and revision”, as well as the existence of stylistic 
conventions, which are essential for the creation of great literature. 
 
The idea/expression dichotomy is of dubious value in relation to music. For 
instance, it has been stated that that music “collapses” the idea/expression 
dichotomy68. One reason for this is that there are a limited number of musical 
notes in a standard major scale. Furthermore, in relation to music it is generally 
accepted that certain expressions cannot be made subject to copyright, in the 
same way that in literature certain genre conventions and basic plots cannot be 
made subject to copyright. Regarding musical works, some chord progressions 
and musical phrases are thought to be too common to be protectable. For 
instance, it is generally accepted that the “twelve-bar blues” structure, which 
generally follows the standard I-II-V chord structure, is not protectable69. 
Therefore, this particular chord structure could be described as the example of a 
general musical “idea” which cannot be made subject to copyright. However, at 
least in purely musical terms, even a generic blues progression is an 
“expression”, not an abstract “idea”. For the purposes of this article, rather than 
using the terms “idea” and “expression”, the term “stylistic convention” is used to 
describe an expression of music that is too generic to be protectable under 
copyright. In this view, under copyright law a “stylistic convention” could not be 
held to be part of the author’s protectable “original” input to a work. As a result, 
no infringement action would succeed if a mere stylistic convention was copied 
from one work and used in another.  
 
4 (a) UK Case study - Assessing Copyright infringement in the context of 
Creative Works 
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 Norowzian v Arks Ltd (No 2) [2000] FSR 363. 
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 Corelli v Gray [1913] TLR 570. See also Rees v Melville [1911-16] MacG CC 168. See however 
Baigent v Random House Group Ltd [2007] FSR 579. 
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 Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria, “The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs” 98 (3rd ed Butterworths, 
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71 (Routledge, New York 2009). 
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 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 117. See also generally Rosen, supra 7. 
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 Vaidhayanathan, supra 16, at 118. 
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Under the CDPA70, a person will infringe copyright if, without having obtained a 
licence, he or she exercises one of the restricted acts e.g. adaptation, 
performance etc.71 In an infringement action, it is necessary for the complainant 
to show a causal connection between the original copyright work and the 
allegedly infringing work. For instance, in Francis Day and Hunter v Bron Lord 
Diplock stated: 
 
“...there must be a sufficient objective similarity between the infringing work and 
the copyright work, or a substantial part of thereof...”72 
 
It is necessary, therefore, to show that the allegedly “infringing” work is derived 
from the copyright work in question.73 Furthermore, an inference of derivation can 
be drawn in certain circumstances, for instance, where the “particular similarities 
relied on are sufficiently close”74 and it can be shown positively that the 
defendant had “familiarity” with the copyright work at issue.75 It appears that 
under UK copyright law, both conscious and unconscious copying can result in 
infringement.76 However, proving a causal link between the two works “will be 
even more difficult in cases of unconscious copying”.77  
 
In the UK, the requirement of the copying of a “substantial part” is crucial.78 
Laddie has stated that although the onus is on the claimant in an infringement 
action, a defendant should try to argue that to the extent that his allegedly 
infringing work is derived from the claimant’s work, the particular material taken 
was not originated by the claimant author and/or it is too generic to be a 
“substantial part”79. In Ladbroke v William Hill, Lord Reid stated that the issue of 
what amounts to a “substantial part” of a work depends on a qualitative test 
rather than a quantitative one.80 In infringement cases involving musical works, 
                                                     
70
 CDPA s 16-27. 
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 Designer’s Guild Ltd. v Russell Williams Textiles Ltd. [2000] 1 WLR 2413, Lord Millet at 2425. 
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 Francis Day & Hunter v Bron [1963] Ch 587. See also Bently & Sherman, “Intellectual Property 
Law” 171-172 (3rd ed. OUP, Oxford 2008). 
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the overall impression given by the musical work is what matters, not whether 
there is a note-for-note taking.81 Furthermore, in cases of musical infringement 
the qualitative analysis82 element of this test depends upon “how music is 
heard”83 i.e. whether a “substantial part” of the original copyright work can be 
“heard” in the context of the allegedly infringing work. 
 
In Hawkes v Paramount84 a twenty second portion of a popular tune “Colonel 
Bogey” was used in a newsreel. This portion, the “hook” of the song, was found 
to amount to a “substantial part” of the work. It can therefore be said that the 
relative value of the particular part is taken into account85. In Coffey v Warner86 
an infringement claim by a singer-songwriter was struck out regarding “vocal 
inflections” in a single phrase. In Coffey, the vocal phrase was transferred from 
one of the complainant’s songs “into another co-written and sung by the pop-star 
Madonna”87. Blackburne J. emphasised that the test for a “substantial part” was 
an objective one and that in this case the claim could not satisfy it88. Bainbridge 
has further stated that courts are unlikely to look favourably upon claims that 
engage in “cherry-picking” or that try to “tailor” parts of the work to make the 
claim more arguable89. In Coffey, it was simply not possible to hear a “substantial 
part” in the allegedly infringing work. With respect to literary works, in Baigent v 
Random House90 it was found that no infringement occurred in relation to two 
books – “Holy Blood, Holy Grail” and “The Da Vinci Code” – because there was 
no copying of original expression. The court reiterated that mere “information, 
facts, ideas, theories and themes” cannot be given copyright protection.91 
 
Recent rulings of the UK High Court92 and Court of Appeal93 in Newspaper 
Licensing Agency v Meltwater take clear influence from the ECJ ruling in Infopaq. 
For this reason, the relevant points articulated in Infopaq must be recalled before 
                                                                                                                                                      
Williams [2001] FSR 271, that “in view of the very limited quantity actually taken, the emphasis 
upon quality may seem overstretched”. Furthermore, it is noted that in light of the Australian “Men 
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the important case of Meltwater is examined.94 Firstly, following Infopaq, the 
originality standard for subsistence of all works is centred on the idea of the 
author’s “intellectual creation”.95 Secondly, in Infopaq it was held that even an 
extract of 11 words could amount to an example of copyright infringement, if 
these 11 words are a reflection of the intellectual creation of the author.96 Thirdly, 
the ECJ stressed that the “exceptions” to copyright, as contained in the 
Information Society Directive, must be interpreted narrowly.97 
 
The primary issue of the case concerned whether Meltwater’s “end users”98 
required a licence from the Newspaper Licensing Agency in order to receive 
media monitoring reports. In deciding that a licence was required, the High Court 
also reached significant conclusions regarding the issues of subsistence and 
infringement, conclusions that were largely upheld by the later Court of Appeal 
decision. In particular, regarding the issue of subsistence, it appears that in the 
light of Infopaq and Meltwater even very small works are protected under 
copyright. On this point, Proudman J. in the High Court stated that even a bare 
headline could amount to an original literary work in its own right provided that 
the headline is the author’s “intellectual creation”.99 This conclusion was upheld 
by the Court of Appeal.100 Following on from this point, in relation to infringement 
Proudman J. stated that a headline or a short extract from the text could amount 
to a “substantial part” of a copyright work. Once again the court relied on Infopaq 
in making this point by stating that the “quality” of the extracted part is what is 
crucial i.e. if the part is a reflection of the author’s intellectual creation then it will 
probably amount to a “substantial part”. As noted above, this point is in line with 
the ruling in Newspaper Licensing Agency Limited v. Marks & Spencer plc101 and 
it was further upheld by the Court of Appeal.102 
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4 (b) Exploring Infringement Cases involving Creative Works in other 
jurisdictions 
 
In France a 2007 case provides useful guidance in relation to the creative use of 
an existing literary work. In Hugo v Plon SA103, the case involved an alleged 
infringement of moral rights regarding an unauthorised sequel to Victor Hugo’s 
“Les Miserables”. The French Supreme Court affirmed that the right to freedom of 
expression, which includes the freedom to create, was protected by Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the court, Article 10 
requires that copyright law must be balanced with the freedom to create. In 
particular, where monopoly protection has expired, copyright ought not be 
allowed to prevent acts of creativity by artists. Geiger has praised this decision as 
providing guidance for the “realignment” of copyright in circumstances where 
creativity is threatened by infringement actions.104 
 
In relation to German law, Article 51 (2) of the German Copyright Act specifically 
allows quotations from copyright works. The extent of this principle was 
challenged in a German Constitutional Court case105 involving the works of 
Bertolt Brecht. In the case a playwright wanted to include quotations from Brecht 
in a new play in order to show Brecht’s words in a new artistic light. The court 
allowed this use stating that it was “a minor infringement of copyright” and one 
which only involved a “minimal financial  loss” for right-holders. The court 
emphasised a liberal interpretation of the “freedom to create” in Article 5(3) of the 
German Basic Law. On the other hand a recent German case showed much less 
tolerance in the area of “sampling”.  In a case involving the work “Metall Auf 
Metall”106 a very short sample of a Kraftwerk sound recording was found to 
amount to an infringement. 
 
A recent case in Australia, Larrikin Music Publishing v EMI Songs Australia107, 
illustrates the difficulties that can arise in assessing infringement in the context of 
musical works.108 As is the case under UK law, under Australian law a 
“substantial part” must be “copied” from one work into another. In Larrikin, it was 
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necessary to consider whether a flute riff, which was taken from the work 
“Kookaburra” and used in the Men at Work song “Down Under” amounted to a 
qualitative “substantial part”. “Kookaburra” can be described as a short work – it 
is a mere four bars long. Further to this, the copied part amounted to two bars of 
“Kookaburra” i.e. 50% of the work. The Federal Court of Australia was satisfied 
that a “substantial part” had been copied from “Kookaburra” and used in “Down 
Under”. In other cases the court’s analysis may involve a comparison of the two 
works in their entirety. For instance, in the Canadian case of Drynan v Rostad109 
an infringement was found where the central melody, key, and chord 
progressions of the plaintiff’s work were all highly similar to the defendant’s work. 
It was found in the case that a “substantial part” had been copied by the later 
artist from the antecedent work. 
 
With regard to “tune copying”, some of the world’s most famous pop musicians 
have faced legal difficulties concerning infringement, even where the copying 
involved occurred “as a result of the subconscious mind”110. For example, in the 
US case of Bright Tunes v George Harrison111, the melodies and chord structures 
of two songs were examined. It was found, under US copyright law, that there 
was “substantial similarity” between the song “My Sweet Lord” and the earlier 
work “He’s So Fine”.112  
 
4 (c) Assessing the Potential for Infringement of Arrangements of Public 
Domain works 
 
With respect to the above analysis of the “idea-expression dichotomy”, it was 
noted that certain musical stylistic conventions are in the public domain. These 
stylistic conventions can be used by all musicians to create new works. However, 
it must also be noted at this stage that it is possible to make use of whole works 
for which copyright protection has expired from the public domain. The creative 
use of a work that is in the public domain – a work which has fallen out of 
copyright - would not be infringement. Nonetheless, with regard to the creative 
use of a new copyright arrangement of a public domain work, an infringement 
action may be feasible. For such a case to succeed, the court would have to be 
of the opinion that the copyright has been infringed through the “taking” of the 
“originality” of the particular copyright arrangement.113  
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For instance, in the UK case of Austin v Columbia114 new musical arrangements 
of old tunes for an opera were copied by the defendant. This was held to be an 
infringement, even though the relevant copied notes in the defendant’s 
arrangement were not identical to the original copyright arrangement. On the 
other hand, in the Australian case of CBS Records v Gross115 it was held that 
“the copyright in a musical arrangement was not infringed where the defendants 
had not used the arranger’s original contribution”116. Furthermore, in the UK case 
of Robertson v Lewis117 the claim centred on copyright arrangements of 
traditional Scottish airs. The late Sir Hugh Robertson had been renowned as the 
leader of the Glasgow Orpheus Choir and had copyright over an arrangement of 
the air “Westering Home”. When the same air, but not the words or 
accompaniment, was recorded by Vera Lynn, the Robertson estate took an 
ultimately unsuccessful copyright infringement case. The Robertson estate failed 
to show that the recorded Vera Lynn version was derived from the Robertson 
arrangement. As Cornish has stated, this case shows that unless it is possible to 
show a clear case of copying the exact notes/accompaniment/words, in practice 
it may be difficult to enforce rights in an arrangement of a traditional tune.118 In 
addition, many traditional melodies have uncertain origin and assessing who 
owns the copyright is not straightforward. In a US case involving the melody of 
the song “This Land Is Your Land”, the estate of Woody Guthrie eventually 
discovered that the late Woody Guthrie had not in fact composed the relevant 
melody himself, but had copied it from an old song recorded by the Carter 
Family.119 
 
5 Analysing Music in the Context of Infringement actions - Examining the 
Role of Musicologists 
 
One other aspect must be considered with regard to cases of musical 
infringement. It is often the case that musical experts, or “musicologists”, are 
called by both sides in the case. However, surely there is no “right” or “wrong” 
way to perceive music. For this reason, it can be difficult for courts to determine 
what amounts to a “substantial part. The role of expert testimony in these kinds of 
cases is of questionable value largely due to this problem of subjectivity120.  
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The difficulty in showing objective similarity in musical cases was illustrated in 
Larrikin. It was not disputed that the short flute riff from “Kookaburra” had been 
an influence on the creation of “Down Under”. A crucial question in assessing 
possible infringement however involved the consideration of whether the 
“reproduction” of two bars of “Kookaburra” in “Down Under” was “objectively 
similar”. In order to undertake this consideration the court said that the test was 
that of the “ordinary reasonable listener” i.e. whether he or she would find 
recognition between the two works. However, the similarity between the works 
had gone unnoticed for many years – between 1981 and 2007, when it was 
noticed on a TV panel show, and even then it took some prompting for the panel 
to “hear” the similarity.121 Nevertheless, the court was of the opinion that the 
“sensitised listener” would notice the resemblance between the two works. This is 
clearly a less “objective” requirement than that of the “ordinary reasonable” 
listener. 
 
In the US122, the recent case of Swirsky v Carey123 also shows the difficulty of 
establishing “objective” criteria with regard to similarity between musical works, 
even when expert testimony is used. The dispute centred on a Mariah Carey 
song “Thank God I Found You”. It was argued by Seth Swirsky that “Thank God I 
Found You” infringed the copyright in his song “One of Those Love Songs”. 
Specifically, it was alleged that the chorus of both works were “substantially 
similar”. Mariah Carey argued that Swirsky had failed to satisfy the “extrinsic” part 
of the “substantial similarity” test i.e. that the evidence did not show an “objective 
similarity” between the two works. The district court made the decision to grant 
summary judgment against Swirsky, stating that the evidence of the plaintiff’s 
musicologist was insufficient. However, the decision to dismiss the case was 
reversed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit and the case was eventually settled. 
Clearly the appeal court was much less dismissive of the potential value of the 
musicologist’s testimony that the district court. Therefore, it is clear that 
acceptance of the apparent usefulness of such “expert” testimony is far from 
universal.  
 
In this vein, Bently has recently criticised the deference shown by judges towards 
“musicological” experts in cases involving musical works124. Nonetheless, 
Crowne and Arman125 have noted that such testimony is often influential on 





 Crucial to US copyright infringement is the fact that copying have occurred. Copying is 
typically established by showing that the alleged infringer had access to the work and that the two 
works are substantially similar. Where there is a high degree of access, the burden of proof of 
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courts, and for this reason, it ought to be made certain that whole works have 
been considered by the experts, not mere portions of works. As Crowne and 
Arman have stated, cases of musical infringement often involve degrees of 
subtlety and music’s value truly lies “in the ear of the beholder”.126 
 
6 (a) The Musician’s Dilemma - Is the Creative Use of Musical Works 
without a licence acceptable under Copyright? 
 
In spite of the history of creative use in various musical cultures127, the courts 
tend to display “very little sympathy for plagiarists”128. Furthermore, in light of the 
above discussion, it is clear that the concepts of “originality” and “infringement” 
are not static, and that while creative use does play a part in a number of musical 
cultures, even within some of these contexts cases of infringement may still 
arise. It is also clear that difficulties inevitably arise when courts attempt to 
assess whether a case of “creative use” is in fact a case of “infringement”. In 
relation to this, the following question is prescient: 
 
“At what point between general chord patterns and specific strings of notes does 
repetition constitute infringement of a protectable expression?”129  
 
Following the recent ECJ case of Infopaq, which was applied in the UK case of 
Meltwater, it is now more difficult than ever to determine when a case of musical 
infringement has occurred. With the state of the law at present, musicians will 
surely find it difficult to evaluate which creative uses are legal and which creative 
uses risk infringement actions. This dilemma is likely to cause musicians to worry 
about making ‘creative use’ of any musical work without a licence.  
 
For instance, it has always been the case that short melodies can attain copyright 
protection. However, post-Infopaq it is interesting to speculate whether a mere 
two or three note musical sequence could now attain copyright protection if it is 
said to be the intellectual creation of the author. On this point, under the current 
law there is no reason why a very short sequence of notes may not receive 
copyright protection, provided that it is sufficiently “original”. Secondly, it is clear 
that the idea of infringement as applied in Infopaq, and described in the UK as 
the taking of a “substantial part”, depends upon a qualitative test focusing upon 
whether the “stamp of individuality” is present in the extracted part. With respect 
to music, this may mean that a very small extract from a musical work may still 
amount to a “substantial part” for the purposes of copyright infringement.  
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In this context, considering that even small works can have copyright protection, 
and that even a taking of a small extract may be an infringing use, it is unlikely 
that any non-original musical elements remain in the public domain. This is 
problematic. As noted above, there are a limited number of notes in a musical 
scale. Given the additional uncertainties associated with using musicologist 
testimony during copyright infringement cases, musicians would be best advised 
to take caution when making ‘creative use’. 
 
6 (b) Chord Progressions and Creative Use 
 
In terms of musical “structures”, such as chord progressions, it was noted above 
that musical “style” has generally not been “monopolised” by copyright law. Some 
chord progressions and musical phrases are thought to be too common to be 
protectable130. As a result, no infringement action would succeed if any of these 
mere stylistic conventions, such as a generic chord progression, is copied from 
one work and used in another. However, although a generic chord progression, 
such as a twelve-bar blues progression, would not be protected, Coulthart has 
recently argued that a mere chord progression could be protectable under 
copyright provided that it is sufficiently original.131 This would appear to be in line 
with recent cases. There is every reason to think, in the wake of Infopaq, 
Meltwater and Larrikin, that even a short progression of chords could be 
protectable if the resulting expression is deemed sufficiently original.  
 
6 (c) Melody Extracts and Creative Use 
 
With regard to the creative use of existing melodies, or tunes, Nettleton and 
Dawson132 have recently queried: 
 
“Can you use two bars of music without permission?” 
 
Following recent cases there appears to be no reason why small, identifiable 
musical riffs would not be protectable.133 Indeed, it is clear, that even a very short 
musical “riff” or “lick” may be protectable if it is sufficiently original i.e. if it is the 
“intellectual creation” of the author.134 Furthermore, even making creative use of 
a small extract from a short melody could amount to a infringement”. It is clear 
from Larrikin135 that where the “quantity taken is large because the work itself is 
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rather short then there is a greater likelihood that a qualitatively substantial part 
has been taken”. For this reason it is possible that only generic expressions, 
such as the common “do-ray-me” ascending scale, are not capable of being 
considered as “original works”, or if not as original works in themselves then as 
“substantial parts” of original works. In other words, it is questionable whether it is 
now the case that any use of “original” materials, expressions and stylistic 
conventions now requires a licence, even if the use is minor and not immediately 
discernible to the average listener.136  
 
Nettleton and Dawson137 have noted that in the context of creative use a 
musician “tweaks” an extract of music too much then “any emotions you hope to 
invoke in the audience may be lost”. However, it is acknowledged that if the 
musician tweaks the extract too little, the musician “may inadvertently infringe 
third parties” copyright”. For instance, Torremans has noted that under UK law if 
the copied “substantial part” is altered substantially, to the extent that a new, 
original work is created, it might be arguable that no infringement ought to 
occur.138 However, under UK law this would only be guaranteed where a 
“substantial part” was so transformed that it is not detectible in the new original 
work at all. 
 
In fact, it is possible that today’s equivalent of the old blues “licks” could be 
protectable under copyright. Provided that the work is original, there now appears 
to be no limit to how short a copyright work may be. In a cautionary vein, 
Toynbee has suggested that the “blues” music of the USA would have been 
greatly inhibited had strict copyright law been enforced over certain “licks”139. 
Moreover if certain “stylistic conventions” had been made subject to copyright, 
this would have had a negative effect on the development of a great deal of 
modern music, much of which is “written in a traditional style”, and is particularly 
influenced by “traditional” and “blues” conventions140. 
 
6 (d) Could Copyright Restrict Creative Use in other Artistic Fields? 
 
In light of the above, many forms of creative use appear to be unacceptable 
under copyright. It may well be the case that only “unoriginal” or “generic” 
examples of creative use are acceptable. If it is the case that only unoriginal or 
generic expressions can be used creatively then there may be little value in the 
practice. As noted above, copyright ought not to be so strict with regard to 
musical works, given the limited number of notes available.141 However, it is also 
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clear that the underlying principles of copyright raised by this article also threaten 
artists in other creative fields. In particular the use of quotation in the context of 
dramatic works, such as occurred the German case involving the works of Brecht 
could be endangered. Similarly, the creation of adaptations or sequels in the 
fields of literature or drama, such as occurred in the French case involving “Les 
Miserables”, could be discouraged. Overall, it is important that in cases involving 
creative works, courts take full account of the need to allow artists a reasonable 
freedom to create. Taking account of Article 10 of the ECHR, as the French 
Supreme Court did in the “Les Miserables” case, is important.  Furthermore, as 
detailed below, there may also be the need for a broader “fair use”-style solution 
to allow creative use. 
  
7 Licensing, “Fair Dealing” and “Fair Use” – Exploring the Possibility of a 
“Creative Use” Exception 
 
Creative use of existing works is technically possible via traditional licensing 
mechanisms. However, this would provide an incomplete solution to the issues 
raised above. While the use of a work is legal where a licence is obtained, this 
may often be impractical, such as in a case involving an orphan work, or it may 
be unaffordable due to financial considerations.142 In addition, some licences 
might simply be refused. Nonetheless, it is possible to accommodate such cases 
of creative use under the “Creative Commons”143 brand of “open licensing”, and 
this type of licensing may become more influential in relation to music in the 
years to come. However, the traditional model of licensing, via the collecting 
societies, remains the most important at present, and it does not currently 
provide the means to properly encourage creative use.144  
 
By definition, “fair dealing” and “fair use” concern situations involving “exceptions” 
i.e. the “permitted” acts as opposed to the “restricted acts”. In light of the above 
UK case study, it is “notable”145  that in contrast to the broad “fair use” provision 
under US copyright law146, the current fair dealing provisions in the UK are 
narrowly enumerated defences to copyright infringement.147 For this reason, it 
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has been noted that the current UK fair dealing provisions are inflexible.148 Unlike 
the position of the Canadian courts, which have recently taken an activist149 
approach to the expansion of fair dealing, the courts in the UK have not taken 
such an approach towards fair dealing. Therefore, in the UK allowing for the kind 
of “creative use” described above as part of a “transformative” or “creative” fair 
dealing would require an extension to the list of permitted purposes under the 
CDPA. In addition, once the purposes were expanded, any prospective “fair 
dealing” would have to be assessed by the courts in relation to the “fairness” 
criteria under the law in the UK as well under the relevant EU and international 
laws, and in particular, the “three-step test”.150  
 
In 2006 the UK Gowers Review151 recommended the enactment of an exception 
for “creative, transformative or derivative works” within the framework of the 
“three-step test”152 in order to “legitimise clearly the reworking of existing material 
for a new purpose or to give it a new meaning”153. This “transformative” 
recommendation was not considered by the subsequent UK IPO consultation 
document154, nor was it revived under the 2011 Hargreaves Review155 despite 
previous remarks by Prime Minister Cameron in favour of expanding the 
copyright exceptions in the UK.156 Nonetheless, it is worth discussing what such 
an exception might look like. 
 
Since there are no cases on “creative use” in the UK, the case law from the US 
on “fair use” and Germany on “freie Benutzung”157, or “free use”, may provide 
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some guidance regarding the possibility of enacting a broader “fair use” style 
exception in the UK with the aim of facilitating creative use. 
 
Under US law, there are four standard factors that must be taken into account in 
a case of apparent “fair dealing”.158 Regarding the first of the four factors, the 
“purpose” of a creative use would probably fall within the category termed by 
Samuelson as “transformative uses”.159 In the US, “fair use” cases involving 
music are not uncommon.160 For instance, in Campbell v Acuff- Rose Music161, 
the US Supreme Court made a finding of fair use in relation to a parody of the 
song “Pretty Woman”, judging that the parody would not impact on the market for 
the original song. Within this category, if a use was not a parody like Campbell, 
but it might fall into a line of cases regarding transformative artistic uses such as 
Blanch v Koons.162 In this vein, Leval163 has argued that creativity ought to be 
central to the idea of “transformative” use and this idea is evident in certain 
judgments in the US.164 However, there is also a line of cases which stresses the 
idea that a “transformative” use is one which utilizes the work in order to perform 
a new function.165 Furthermore, even in the cases that focus on creativity, it is 
often the case that the “transformative” use is creative in a different sense than 
the original work e.g. parody (Campbell) or collage effect (Graham). On this point 
Arewa has argued: 
 
“... even if doctrines intended to enable future uses, such as fair use, are taken 
into account, such property rules have thus far not facilitated a clear delineation 
between the scope of acceptable and unacceptable uses of existing material, 
particularly in contexts of living music traditions.”166 
 
Nonetheless, if “creativity” is truly at the root of “transformative” use, then it would 
seem unfair if creative uses of musical compositions were not acceptable. 
 
Regarding the second factor, the “nature” of the work considers a number of 
factors including the type of work and whether the work is published or 
unpublished. The fact that the work is unpublished, and the particular use is 
“creative”, as opposed to “factual”, may not necessarily prevent a fair use 
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finding.167 Regarding the third factor, the substantiality of the taking would have to 
be assessed in light of each case. In line with the fourth factor, potential harm to 
the market, it has been noted that the “amount taken should only be judged 
excessive if it harmed the market for the work”.168 This is said to be in line with 
the decision in Suntrust Bank v Houghton Mifflin Co.169 Overall, it is conceivable 
that the US fair use test would be useful when applied in the context of musical 
creativity.  
 
In relation to Germany, the idea of “freie Benutzung”170 is of note. Referring to 
Ulmer, Geller has stated that under this doctrine if materials are copied from a 
copyright work and used in another work, there will be no infringement if the 
materials taken are sufficiently subsumed within the new work.171 This idea of 
“free use” does involve a certain amount of creative transformation and the court 
can artistic considerations into account.172 Furthermore, the clear purpose of the 
“free use” provision is to encourage cultural progress.173 Nonetheless, even the 
German idea of “free use” under s 24(2) specifically excludes cases involving 
music where recognisable melodies remain present in the “new” work. Despite 
this, the German concept provides some guidance. As stated above, exceptions 
must be compatible with the “three-step test”. In this regard, the German 
exception for “free use” provides some guidance in relation to enacting broader 
exceptions that allow for elements of “transformative use” without falling foul of 
the “three-step test”.174 
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Neither of the above two concepts provides a perfect fit for cases involving 
“creative use” of music. However, the principle at the base of both “fair use” and 
“free use” i.e. the encouragement of creativity and cultural progress, does fit with 
the creative practices of artists. For this reason, moving towards a broad “fair 
use” style exception in the UK, taking guidance from the US and German 
experiences, would improve the situation.175 Any worries that taking a broad 
interpretation of “creative use” might prejudice authors’ rights could be allayed via 
the “fairness” assessment and via application of the “three-step test”. On this 
point, it is clear that analysis of the “three-step test” by various national courts 
has not been uniform.176 In fact, there are persuasive arguments for taking a 
more liberal interpretation of the test.177 
 
Furthermore, there are some recent precedents for change in this area; Israel 
recently moved from a narrow fair dealing approach to a broad fair use 
approach.178 As Afori has remarked, the need for a balanced copyright law 
motivated this change.179 Nonetheless, with regard to the above case study, the 
UK courts have traditionally been conservative in applying statutory exemptions 
to copyright. As Burrell has remarked, merely enacting a new exception into the 
law may not necessarily change the traditional attitude of the courts180. 
 
Any possible exemption allowing “creative use” would probably have to be 
pursued at an EU level.181 It has been argued that such an innovation is 
conceivable.182 Nevertheless, a change in EU policy on this issue does not seem 
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to be on the cards at present.183 Indeed, the ECJ has recently argued in favour of 
interpreting the existing “Infosoc” defences narrowly.184  
 
8 Conclusion  
 
One of the purposes of copyright is surely to encourage creativity. Copyright 
should do more to facilitate “creative use”. In order to facilitate musical creativity 
effectively copyright must provide a fair use-style solution to facilitate creative 
use. If such an innovation were to come about, it would also be important to 
educate musicians, and artists in other fields, about what amounts to acceptable 
“creative use”. In line with the opinion of D’Agostino, to aid artists it might be 
useful for organisations such as PRS to produce “fair use guidelines” with 
respect to music185. 
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